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Abstract
Entrepreneurship is a key factor in promoting growth in output and employment. Consequently, to
encourage new start-ups, most governments in developed countries have public venture capital
programs. The authors develop a model that endogenously determines the number of
entrepreneurs and the optimal quantity of ﬁnancing and managerial advice provided by a public
venture capital program. Their analysis is based on a model of occupational choice that has
informational asymmetries regarding the ability of entrepreneurs. The authors identify
circumstances under which over- or underinvestment can occur. They also show that the
equilibrium is characterized by an inefﬁcient number (too many or too few) of less-able
entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the authors ﬁnd that the government faces disincentives in providing
small amounts of managerial advice; larger amounts of such advice may be optimal.
Note: This study is based on a hypothetical model. The authors’ theoretical ﬁndings relate to
public venture capital programs in general and not to the Business Development Bank of Canada.
JEL classiﬁcation: D28, G24, G28, J24, M13
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets; Fiscal policy; Labour markets
Résumé
L’entrepreneuriat est un ingrédient clé de la croissance de la production et de l’emploi. C’est
pourquoi la plupart des États industrialisés possèdent des programmes conçus pour faciliter
l’accès des jeunes entreprises au capital de risque. Les auteures ont mis au point un modèle qui
détermine de manière endogène le nombre d’entrepreneurs ainsi que la quantité de ﬁnancement et
de conseils managériaux fournie optimalement par un programme public d’accès au capital de
risque. Leur analyse repose sur un modèle de choix professionnel où la compétence des
entrepreneurs pose un problème d’asymétrie d’information. Les auteures établissent quelles
conditions peuvent donner lieu à un surinvestissement ou, au contraire, à un sous-investissement.
Elles montrent par ailleurs que l’équilibre se caractérise par la présence en nombre inefﬁcient
(trop grand ou trop faible) d’entrepreneurs de moindre compétence. Elles constatent enﬁn que
l’intervention des autorités publiques a pour effet de réduire le bien-être si elle ne s’accompagne
que d’une quantité limitée de conseils managériaux; il pourrait donc être optimal d’offrir
davantage de conseils aux entreprises.
Note : L’étude est fondée sur un modèle hypothétique. Les résultats théoriques obtenus par les
auteurs se rapportent aux programmes publics de capital de risque en général, et non à ceux de la
Banque de développement du Canada.
Classiﬁcation JEL : D28, G24, G28, J24, M13
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers; Politique budgétaire; Marchés du travail1. Introduction
Most governments recognize the fact that entrepreneurs play an important role in creating
employment and promoting growth in output and productivity (Audretsch and Thurik
2001). As a result, a large number of government programs are aimed at encouraging the
development of new businesses.
In this paper, we investigate the eﬀects of a government venture capital program
on entrepreneurship, the allocation of capital, and managerial advice. The government
venture capital program consists of loans to new entrepreneurs along with business advice.
The government runs the program through a government bank, which we call the Business
Development Bank (BDB). Our main result shows that the government program cannot
induce the optimal number of entrepreneurs, because when individuals are free to choose
their occupation, they do so without taking into account the eﬀect of their choice on the
welfare of other individuals—entrepreneurs and workers. This makes the occupational-
choice equilibrium suboptimal compared with the case where the government can control
access to occupations: the number of entrepreneurs is too low or too high. We also ﬁnd
that an increase in the amount of managerial advice, starting from a situation where no
advice is provided, reduces welfare. This is somewhat surprising, because we would expect
that a bit of advice is always beneﬁcial. Providing a small amount of advice, however, has
a very small impact on the probability of the success of a business, while it has a huge
cost (providing advice is costly). Thus, a little bit of advice can be more detrimental for
welfare than no advice at all. We also show that larger amounts of managerial advice are
optimal, which implies that governments should not interfere in business decisions beyond
the provision of capital, unless they have enough expertise to provide the right level of
advice. With respect to capital allocation, we ﬁnd that the optimal allocation involves
either over- or underinvestment relative to the proﬁt-maximizing allocation, as a result of
the redistributive motive of the government.
Economic theory provides three rationales for government intervention in the sup-
ply of entrepreneurship. The ﬁrst rationale is the positive externality created through
research and development (R&D), which serves to make the social rate of return on R&D
1expenditures exceed the private rate of return by a considerable amount (see, for example,
Griliches 1992). The second rationale stems from the empirical evidence of ﬁrm forma-
tion, which shows that entrepreneurs are liquidity-constrained. For example, Evans and
Jovanovic (1989) ﬁnd that most individuals who enter self-employment face a binding liq-
uidity constraint and therefore use a suboptimal level of capital to start up their business.
Other studies ﬁnd that the probability of becoming an entrepreneur increases with the
size of assets held by the individual (Evans and Leighton 1989), and depends positively on
whether the individual ever received an inheritance or gift (Blanchﬂower and Oswald 1998).
Furthermore, Holtz-Eakin, Joulfain, and Rosen (1994) ﬁnd that liquidity constraints are
not only important for entry into entrepreneurship, but are also important in determining
the likelihood of entrepreneurial failure: the probability of enterprise survival increases
with the size of an inheritance. Recent studies have shown that liquidity constraints limit
many forms of business investment and investment in R&D (Hall 1992, Hao and Jaﬀe 1993,
Himmelberg and Petersen 1994, and Hubbard 1998).
Liquidity constraints are caused by informational asymmetries that result from ad-
verse selection and moral hazard problems. Adverse selection problems arise when an
entrepreneur is better informed about their ability and, thus, their probability of success,
than are outside investors. Moral hazard problems arise when entrepreneurial eﬀort is un-
observable by outside investors. Informational asymmetries can thus make external capital
more expensive than internally generated capital.1 Furthermore, because the wealth of
potential entrepreneurs is limited, they require substantial outside ﬁnancing. The lack of
collateral and a track record make it diﬃcult for new entrepreneurs to obtain bank ﬁnanc-
ing. The dominant form of external ﬁnancing is thus venture capital. Venture capitalists
provide both ﬁnancial assistance and managerial expertise, and attempt to address infor-
mational asymmetries by extensively scrutinizing and monitoring entrepreneurial projects.
Informational asymmetries are not completely eliminated, however.
The third rationale for government intervention in the supply of entrepreneurship is
1 See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers and Majluf (1984), Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984), and
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for in-depth analyses of the types of problems that arise from asymmetric
information between entrepreneurs and outside investors.
2the fact that public venture capital programs can play a role in certifying new ﬁrms to
outside investors (Lerner 2002). This is one way to overcome the informational asymme-
tries described above. The idea is that government programs can identify and support the
creation of new ﬁrms in industries that do not attract private venture capital (for example,
technology-intensive industries). According to ﬁnancial theory, this failure to attract capi-
tal might be due to a type of “herding” behaviour; i.e., private venture capitalists herding
themselves into particular industries. Government certiﬁcation of promising ﬁrms might
shift some private venture capital into these neglected areas. This rationale is not based on
the assumption that the government has some advantage over the private sector in certify-
ing new ﬁrms; rather, it recognizes the fact that the private sector is not willing to assume
the certiﬁcation role, owing to possible free-riding problems. This view is consistent with
evidence that private venture capital focuses more on the later stages of a ﬁrm’s growth
and development than on the early stages of a start-up (Amit, Brander, and Zott 1997).
Although most of the literature focuses on private venture capital, a considerable
proportion of capital is publicly ﬁnanced (see, for example, OECD 1996). Vaillancourt
(1997) shows that 44 per cent of the stock of venture capital in Canada in 1994 was in
the form of public funds (funds ﬁnanced by the government, or funds that beneﬁted from
tax incentives).2 The U.S. Small Business Administration provides ﬁnancing to start-up
businesses.3 The governments of Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands also
have ﬁnancial programs, to assist unemployed workers who start businesses (Bendick and
Egan 1987, OECD 1996 and 1997).
Despite the importance of public venture capital programs, economic analysis of them
has largely been ignored.4 In this paper, we consider liquidity constraints to be exogenous
and develop a model that endogenously determines the optimal quantity of ﬁnancing and
managerial advice provided by the public venture capital program. Optimality is achieved
2 This was up from 15 per cent in 1989, 23 per cent in 1991, and 43 per cent in 1993.
3 Lerner (1996) brieﬂy describes the U.S. government programs towards entrepreneurship between 1958
and 1996.
4 There is an extensive literature on private venture capital. See, for example, Kanniainen and
Keuschnigg (2000 and 2001), and Kanniainen and Lepp¨ am¨ aki (2002), Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2000).
3by maximizing a utilitarian social welfare function, and thus involves redistribution from
the more-able to the less-able entrepreneurs. The model assumes that the government
faces the following two informational asymmetries: it is unable to observe the ability of en-
trepreneurs, and it is unable to observe entrepreneurial eﬀort. Given these two constraints,
the ﬁrst-best allocation cannot be achieved, because the optimal contract involving ﬁnanc-
ing and managerial advice must provide the right incentives for self-selection. Our model
thus combines the literature on self-selection5 with that on occupational choice.6
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe our model.
Section 3 considers the case where the government has full information regarding en-




Individuals in this economy can become either entrepreneurs or workers. Workers are
endowed with one unit of labour, which they supply inelastically. All workers are assumed
to be equally productive. Entrepreneurs, however, diﬀer in ability according to an ability
parameter µ, with µ2 > µ1.7 There are Ni individuals of ability type i = 1;2, and
N = ΣiNi is the total population. The preferences of entrepreneurs and workers for
income are identical and are given by the concave utility function u(¢), u00(¢) < 0 < u0(¢),
u(0) = 0, which reﬂects the fact that individuals are risk-averse.
2.2 Production
Entrepreneurs of type i supply eﬀort, ei, hire labour, `i, and borrow capital, Ki, to produce
a homogeneous good according to the production technology Fi(`i;Ki). The production
function obeys the standard properties: Fi
j > 0, Fi
jj < 0, Fi
jj0 > 0, j;j0 2 f`;Kg, j 6= j0.
5 See, for example, Stiglitz (1982).
6 See, for example, Kihlstrom and Laﬀont (1979), Kanbur (1981), Boadway, Marchand, and Pestieau
(1991), and Boadway et al. (1998).
7 Alternatively, we could have written the model with n discrete types of individuals. This would not
change our results, but would make the notation more complicated.
4Production is risky; the probability of success depends on the entrepreneurial input, deﬁned
as "i = eiµi, and the managerial advice from the government, a. We will come back to this
shortly. Neither ei nor µi is directly observable by the government, but capital, labour,
and output are, and so, as a result, is entrepreneurial input, "i. Entrepreneurial eﬀort is
costly, with the cost function, h(ei), convex in eﬀort, h0(¢) > 0, h00(¢) > 0.
2.3 The government’s objective
As stated in the introduction, entrepreneurs who lack managerial experience (i.e., have
no track record) and their own resources ﬁnd it diﬃcult to raise external ﬁnancing. This
provides the government with a rationale to intervene and ﬁnance entrepreneurial projects
that would otherwise never be completed. The government sets up a public venture capital
program, which is implemented by the BDB. (Throughout this paper, we refer to the BDB
and the government interchangeably as the same entity.) In addition to ﬁnancial assistance,
the government provides managerial advice, which increases the entrepreneur’s probability
of success. The role of the BDB is thus threefold: to provide ﬁnancing of entrepreneurial
projects that are subject to market failure in capital markets, to provide managerial advice,
and to redistribute from more-able to less-able entrepreneurs. This redistribution involves
the maximization of a utilitarian social welfare function, as deﬁned below.
We use a to denote the managerial input provided by the BDB, and we assume that
the probability of success of a type i entrepreneur is a function of the entrepreneurial input
"i = eiµi and the managerial input a. For simplicity, we assume the following functional
form for the probability of success: p("i;a) = "ip(a), where "i 2 [0;1], p : I R+ ! [0;1],
p(0) = 0.
2.4 Sequence of decisions
Stage 1: The government oﬀers ﬁnancial contracts, (r1;K1) and (r2;K2), and man-
agerial advice, a, to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function.
Stage 2: Individuals decide whether to become workers or entrepreneurs. Individuals
who become entrepreneurs choose the ﬁnancial contract designed for their type.
Stage 3: Entrepreneurs select the amount of labour to hire, and the entrepreneurial
5eﬀort required to maximize their expected utility.
The equilibrium concept we employ is that of subgame perfect equilibrium. To solve
for the equilibrium, we start, as usual, at the end of the game.
2.5 The entrepreneur’s production decision
Assuming that the entrepreneur earns zero proﬁts in the event of a failure, we can write
the expected utility of a type i entrepreneur as
"ip(a)u
h





where we have written entrepreneurial income in terms of the variables that are directly
observable by the government, with the exception of the entrepreneur’s type, µi. We assume
that, if entrepreneurs are not successful, they earn zero revenue. In this case, workers are
laid oﬀ and receive no pay. Capital is assumed to be speciﬁc to the ﬁrm; if the project is
not successful, entrepreneurs repay nothing to the bank. The entrepreneur chooses eﬀort,
labour, and capital to maximize the expected utility of income before the uncertainty is
resolved. To examine this, we separate the entrepreneurs’ problem into two stages, with
capital chosen ﬁrst, and eﬀort and labour second. Solving backwards, an entrepreneur of




`(`i;Ki) = w; (3)
allow us to obtain the eﬀort function "i(w;ri;Ki) and the labour-demand function
`i(w;Ki), with "i
w < 0, "i
K R 0, "i
r < 0, `i
w < 0, and `i
K > 0.8
Substituting "i(w;ri;Ki) and `i(w;Ki) into the entrepreneurs’ objective function de-
ﬁnes the indirect utility function Ωi(a;w;ri;Ki).
8 Comparative statics on the ﬁrst-order conditions (2) and (3) yield @"i=@w = ¡(1=∆)(ui0 ¡
"iui00(h0=µi))`i < 0, @`i=@w = 1=Fi
`` < 0, @"i=@Ki = (1=∆)(ui0 ¡ "iui00(h0=µi))[Fi
K ¡ (1 + ri)] R 0,
@`i=@Ki = ¡Fi
`K=Fi
`` > 0, @"i=@ri = ¡(1=∆)(ui0 ¡ "iui00(h0=µi))Ki < 0, where ∆ ´ 2ui0(h0=µi) ¡
"iui00((h0=µi))2 + "iui0(h00=(µi)2) > 0.
6Lemma 1 The indirect utility function, Ωi(a;w;ri;Ki), satisﬁes:
@Ωi
@a
= "ip0(a) ¢ ui > 0; (4)
@Ωi
@w
= ¡"ip(a) ¢ ui0
¢ `i < 0; (5)
@Ωi
@ri = ¡"ip(a) ¢ ui0
¢ Ki < 0; (6)
@Ωi
@Ki = "ip(a) ¢ ui0
¢ [Fi
K ¡ (1 + ri)] R 0: (7)
For the analysis of the government’s problem, it is helpful to construct entrepreneurs’
indiﬀerence curves in (K;r)¡space. The marginal rate of substitution between K and r














K ¡ (1 + ri)]
Ki R 0 as Fi
K R (1 + ri): (8)
Given (8), it follows that the indiﬀerence curves have the shape indicated in Figure 1. We
assume throughout this paper that the indiﬀerence curves satisfy a single-crossing property.
There are two scenarios for which a single-crossing property holds:
(i) F1

































The two possibilities show that indiﬀerence curves of diﬀerent types can intersect on either
(i) their increasing region, or (ii) their decreasing region. Figure 1(a) illustrates the case
where single-crossing property (i) holds and Figure 1(b) illustrates the case where single-
crossing property (ii) holds. As the ﬁgure indicates, property (i) implies that the more-able
entrepreneurs have higher marginal rates of substitution between r and K for any given
(K;r). This, in turn, implies that, for a given interest rate, more-able entrepreneurs
prefer a higher level of capital. The opposite holds for single-crossing property (ii). Thus,
diﬀerences in marginal rates of substitution provide a basis for self-selection.
Before discussing the government’s problem in detail, we wish to emphasize that
the government oﬀers entrepreneurs (ri;Ki) contracts that diﬀer for the two types. If
an entrepreneur were able to borrow as much capital as they would like at the interest
7rates oﬀered by the government, the entrepreneur would select the level of capital that
maximizes utility, or equivalently proﬁts, taking as given the interest rate ri, i = 1;2. If the
government had full information about entrepreneurs’ types, it would charge entrepreneurs
of diﬀerent types diﬀerent interest rates, so that r1 6= r2. At the given interest rate ri,
a type i entrepreneur chooses Ki to solve the familiar ﬁrst-order condition, Fi
K = 1 + ri.
From (8), this implies that MRSi
r;K = 0 when proﬁts are maximized. Such an outcome
is depicted in Figures 1(a) and 1(b). From this point on, we will refer to the allocation
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As we will show shortly, the proﬁt-maximizing allocation is, in general, suboptimal; that
is, social welfare can be increased if the government chooses both the interest rate and the
amount of capital employed by the entrepreneur. Thus, the government’s redistributive
motive can result in a failure to obtain allocations A and/or B in Figures 1(a) and 1(b),
even when the government has full information about entrepreneurs’ types. A fortiori,
this will also be true in the asymmetric information case, as allocations A and B are not
incentive-compatible. That is, more-able entrepreneurs have an incentive to mimic those
who are less able, to obtain a lower interest rate. The government is aware of this incentive
when selecting its optimal policy.
82.6 The occupational choice
Before we examine the government’s problem, we need to determine the division of the
population between entrepreneurs and workers. Recall that individuals are free to select
their occupation, and they will do so based on a comparison of the utility obtained from
becoming a worker or an entrepreneur. The marginal individual is indiﬀerent between
becoming an entrepreneur and becoming a worker. To ﬁx ideas, let us assume that the
marginal individual is of type 1.
Assumption 1: The occupational-choice equilibrium is interior and the marginal en-
trepreneur is type 1.
Since the utility function is increasing in µi, it follows that all type 2 individuals
become entrepreneurs. Assumption 1 thus implies that, in equilibrium, we have two types
of entrepreneurs, which ensures that the government is able to redistribute from the more-
able to the less-able entrepreneurs.
At this stage, individuals take the optimal contracts (ri;Ki) as given and anticipate
the utility of being an entrepreneur Ωi(a;w;ri;Ki). For the marginal individual, the
following condition must hold:
Ω1(a;w;r1;K1) = u(w): (9)
Occupational-choice condition (9) determines the wage rate w(a;r1;K1), with wa > 0,
wr < 0, dwK R 0.9
Let E1 denote the number of entrepreneurs of type 1. The equilibrium value of E1
must satisfy the following labour-market clearing condition:
N2(1 + `2) + E1(1 + `1) = N: (10)
Equation (10) determines the number of entrepreneurs of type 1 E1(a;r1;K1;K2), the
properties of which are given in Lemma 2.
9 Comparative statics on (9) give: @w=@a = ¡(@Ω1=@a)=((@Ω1=@w) ¡ u10) > 0, @w=@r1 =
¡(@Ω1=@r1)=((@Ω1=@w) ¡ u10) < 0, @w=@K1 = ¡(@Ω1=@K1)=(@Ω1=@w) ¡ u10) R 0.










































1 + `1N2 @`2
@K2 < 0: (14)
The eﬀect of a change in a on the number of entrepreneurs is shown in Equation (11): an
increase in a increases the number of entrepreneurs by raising the wage rate and, hence,
reducing the demand for labour. Equation (12) shows that an increase in r1 has the
opposite eﬀect. Equation (13) shows that an increase in K1 has an ambiguous eﬀect on
the number of entrepreneurs, and depends on the sign of (@w=@K1). That is, an increase
in K1 directly increases the demand for labour and decreases the number of entrepreneurs.
If (@w=@K1) > 0, however, the general-equilibrium eﬀect of a change in K1 on the wage
may oﬀset this direct eﬀect on labour demand by increasing the wage and decreasing the
demand for labour. Equation (14) shows that an increase in K2 directly increases the
demand for labour and reduces the number of entrepreneurs.
2.7 The government’s problem
We are ready to consider the BDB’s problem. Assume that the BDB does not discriminate
with respect to the amount of advice it provides to diﬀerent types of entrepreneurs.10 The
government chooses the managerial input a and the bundles (ri;Ki) to maximize the
following utilitarian social welfare function:
max
fa;r1;r2;K1;K2g
W ´ E1Ω1(a;w;r1;K1) + N2Ω2(a;w;r2;K2) + (N1 ¡ E1)u(w): (15)
The BDB faces three constraints. The ﬁrst is a zero-proﬁt constraint, given by
"1p(a)(1 + r1)E1K1 + "2p(a)(1 + r2)N2K2 ¡ a = (1 + r)(E1K1 + N2K2); (16)
10 Although interesting, the analysis becomes very complicated if we assume that the BDB oﬀers dif-
ferent amounts of advice to diﬀerent types of entrepreneurs.
10where r is the exogenous risk-free interest rate. The zero-proﬁt condition implies that either
r2 < r < r1 or r2 > r > r1. Given that one of the BDB’s goals is to redistribute from
type 2 entrepreneurs to type 1, we focus on equilibrium allocations for which r2 > r > r1.
The zero-proﬁt constraint implies that there is no cross-subsidization from the rest of the
economy. We choose to work with this assumption for simplicity.11
The zero-proﬁt constraint can be used to solve for r2 as a function of a, r1, K1, and
K2. It can be shown that r2(a;r1;K1;K2) is not monotonic in any of its arguments.12 The
second and third constraints faced by the BDB ensure that type 2 entrepreneurs have no
incentive to mimic type 1, and vice versa. These are the self-selection constraints. Using a
“hat” to denote the variables that apply to the mimicking entrepreneur, the self-selection
constraints are given by
Ω2(a;w;r2;K2) ¸ b Ω2(a;w;r1;K1); (17)
Ω1(a;w;r1;K1) ¸ b Ω1(a;w;r2;K2): (18)
It is straightforward that only the ﬁrst self-selection constraint can be binding when the
single-crossing property is satisﬁed.
The Lagrangian for the BDB is thus
max
fa;r1;K1;K2g
L =E1Ω1(a;w;r1;K1) + N2Ω2(a;w;r2;K2) + (N1 ¡ E1)u(w)
+ ¸[Ω2(a;w;r2;K2) ¡ b Ω2(a;w;r1;K1)]; (19)
11 If we allow that the BDB could be subsidized, the zero-proﬁt constraint becomes
"1p(a)(1 + r1)E1K1 + "2p(a)(1 + r2)N2K2 ¡ a + s = (1 + r)(E1K1 + N2K2);
where s is the subsidy. In this case, with a positive subsidy we can have r > r2 > r1. This possibility
would not change our results.
12 Totally diﬀerentiating the zero-proﬁt condition (16) yields the following properties: @r2=@a =
(1 ¡ "1p0(a)(1 + r1)E1K1 ¡ "2p0(a)(1 + r2)N2K2 + ±1(@E1=@a))="2p(a)N2K2 R 0, @r2=@r1 =
(¡(@"1=@r1)p(a)(1 + r1)E1K1 ¡ "1p(a)E1K1 + ±1(@E1=@r1))="2p(a)N2K2 R 0, @r2=@K1 =
(¡(@"1=@K1)p(a)(1 + r1)E1K1 ¡ "1p(a)E1K1 + ±1(@E1=@K1))="2p(a)N2K2 R 0, @r2=@K2 =
(±2N2 + ±1K1(@E1=@K2) ¡ (@"2=@K2)p(a)(1 + r2)N2K2)="2p(a)N2K2 R 0, where ±i ´ [(1 + r) ¡
"ip(a)(1 + ri)] R 0, i = 1;2.
11where we take into account that r2 is a function of (a;r1;K1;K2). The government
chooses (a;ri;Ki), i = 1;2 to maximize (19), anticipating the eﬀect of its choice on wages
w(a;r1;K1), labour `i(w;Ki), entrepreneurial input "i(w;ri;Ki), and the number of type
1 entrepreneurs E1(a;r1;K1;K2).
3. The Full-Information Case
We ﬁrst consider the case where the BDB has full information about entrepreneurs’ abil-
ities. Thus, the self-selection constraint (17) is not binding. The optimum allocation in
the full-information case is obtained by setting ¸ to zero in the Lagrangian function de-
scribed in section 2.7. We are interested in comparing the optimum allocation with the
proﬁt-maximizing allocation that solves Fi
K = 1 + ri, i = 1;2, represented by A and B in
Figures 1(a) and 1(b). To avoid rendering the notation too cumbersome, we use the same
notation for the full-information allocation as we did for the proﬁt-maximizing allocation.
Proposition 1 With full information about entrepreneurs’ types, the optimal allocation
involves entrepreneurs employing either too much, too little, or just enough capital relative









The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. The government, when se-
lecting (ri;Ki), sets the marginal rate of substitution equal to the slope of the budget
constraint. Given that (@r1=@K1) and (@r2=@K2) are ambiguous in sign, the sign of
the marginal rate of substitution between r and K is ambiguous for both types of en-
trepreneurs. Thus, compared with the proﬁt-maximizing allocation for the same interest
rates, both types of entrepreneurs employ either too little, too much, or just enough capital
at the optimal allocation with full information. Four possible cases for the full-information
allocation are illustrated in Figure 2 for the case where single-crossing property (i) holds.
Essentially, Figure 2 compares the optimal allocation (ri;Ki) chosen by the government
with the proﬁt-maximizing allocation for the same interest rates, ri.13 The optimum al-
13 Alternatively, we could compare the optimal allocation chosen by the government with the proﬁt-
12location for a more-able entrepreneur is at A or A0, whereas the optimum allocation for
a less-able entrepreneur can be at B or B0. At A0 and B0, both types of entrepreneurs
are credit-rationed compared with the proﬁt-maximizing allocation, whereas at A and
B they overinvest compared with the proﬁt-maximizing outcome. A similar ﬁgure can be
drawn for the case where single-crossing property (ii) holds, with the same results applying
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The ﬁgure shows that entrepreneurs, if allowed to select their levels of capital freely, have
no incentive to take into account the eﬀect their capital choice will have on the BDB’s
budget constraint. The BDB does take this into account when maximizing welfare by
setting the marginal rates of substitution equal to the slope of the budget constraint.
4. Asymmetric Information
When the BDB is unable to observe entrepreneurial ability, type 2 entrepreneurs have an
incentive to mimic type 1 entrepreneurs, to obtain a more favourable rate of interest. The
maximizing allocation of capital when the government chooses the interest rates that maximize the
social welfare function W. It is easy to see that the result of Proposition 1 holds for this alternative
comparison, as well. When the government chooses ri to maximize its objective, this can shift the
indiﬀerence curves of the two types up or down. Given the position of the new equilibrium allocations
relative to the proﬁt-maximizing ones, we end up with one of the four cases depicted in Figure 2.
13BDB takes this behaviour into account when deciding upon the optimal bundles (a;ri;Ki).
Proposition 2 With asymmetric information on entrepreneurs’ types, type 1 entr-
epreneurs are constrained to employ either too little or too much capital relative to the
full-information allocation, whereas type 2 entrepreneurs’ employment of capital is non-









Proposition 2 indicates the eﬀect of asymmetric information on the optimal employ-
ment of capital; it is illustrated in Figure 3(a) for the case where single-crossing property
(i) applies, and in Figure 3(b) for the case where single-crossing property (ii) applies. For
the former case, preventing type 2 entrepreneurs from mimicking type 1 entrepreneurs im-
plies that those who are type 1 are constrained to employ too little capital relative to the
full-information and proﬁt-maximizing outcomes. Thus, asymmetric information results
in credit-rationing of type 1 entrepreneurs for this case. Because the sign of (@r2=@K2) is
ambiguous, type 2 entrepreneurs may employ either too little or too much capital relative
to the proﬁt-maximizing outcome. Figure 3(a) depicts the latter case. This result is similar
to one obtained by Boadway et al. (1998), where over- or underinvesting results because
of adverse selection in the private credit market. In their model, however, government
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The implications of Proposition 2 for the supply of entrepreneurship when the single-
crossing property (i) holds is summarized in Corollary 2.1. A similar implication can be
obtained for the case of single-crossing property (ii).
Corollary 2.1 In the presence of asymmetric information, credit-rationing of less-able
entrepreneurs has an ambiguous eﬀect on the number of entrepreneurs.
Equation (13) shows that the eﬀect of a reduction in K1 on E1 is ambiguous. It depends
on (i) how labour demand is directly aﬀected by a change in K1, and (ii) the general-
equilibrium eﬀect that a change in K1 has on the wage rate. If the latter eﬀect is small,
then a reduction in K1 relative to the full-information case increases the number of en-
trepreneurs by reducing the proportion of individuals who are employed as workers. The
result in Proposition 3 compares the number of type 1 entrepreneurs in the equilibrium
with occupational choice with the number chosen by the government if it had direct control
over access to occupations. We refer to the latter as the eﬃcient E1.
Proposition 3 Irrespective of the informational assumption, the occupational-choice equi-
librium is characterized by an ineﬃcient number of type 1 entrepreneurs.
A formal proof of this result is given in Appendix C. If the government can control
access to occupations, it chooses E1 type 1 individuals to enter the entrepreneurial oc-
cupation to maximize welfare subject to the zero-proﬁt condition and the self-selection
15constraints. In this case, the wage rate is determined by the labour-market clearing condi-
tion, w(E1;K1;K2). We can see the intuition behind this result by analyzing the indirect
eﬀects of an additional type 1 individual entering the pool of entrepreneurs. When one
more individual decides to become an entrepreneur, the demand for labour increases and,
as a result, so do wages. An increase in wages, in turn, raises the welfare of workers and
reduces that of entrepreneurs (both type 1 and type 2). At the same time, the higher
number of type 1 entrepreneurs increases the cost of capital for type 2 entrepreneurs, thus
reducing their welfare. Furthermore, a higher E1 may tighten or relax the self-selection
constraint. This constraint requires that a type 2 entrepreneur has no incentive to mimic
a type 1 entrepreneur. An increase in the number of type 1 entrepreneurs increases the
wage rate, which in turn lowers the utility of a type 2 entrepreneur. At the same time, a
higher wage rate lowers the utility of the mimicker. The eﬀect on the diﬀerence between
the two utilities is ambiguous; it may tighten or relax the self-selection constraint. Since
a type 1 individual who decides to become an entrepreneur ignores these eﬀects, the equi-
librium number of type 1 entrepreneurs is ineﬃcient—too high or too low. This result is
a consequence of the BDB’s redistributive motive.
The important insight of Proposition 3 is that government venture capital alone cannot
induce the optimal number of entrepreneurs: when individuals choose their occupation
freely, they ignore the eﬀect of their choices on the welfare of other entrepreneurs and
workers. This suggests that the government might need additional instruments to achieve
the optimal supply of entrepreneurship.
The result summarized in Proposition 3 holds whether there is full or asymmetric
information. It is diﬃcult, however, to quantify the eﬀect of asymmetric information on
the number of type 1 entrepreneurs, because changes in their number have an ambiguous
eﬀect on the self-selection constraint.
We next consider the eﬀect of changes in managerial input a on welfare. To do so, it








































The ﬁrst two terms in (20) show the direct eﬀect of an increase in managerial input a
on welfare. This eﬀect is positive because a higher managerial input increases the utility
of both types of entrepreneurs. The second term shows the indirect eﬀect of an increase
in a on welfare operating through a change in the wage rate. A higher a increases the
wage rate, which in turn has an ambiguous eﬀect on welfare: it increases workers’ utility
while reducing the utility of both types of entrepreneurs. The third term in (20) shows
the indirect eﬀect of a change in a on welfare operating through a change in the rate of
interest faced by type 2 entrepreneurs. We also know that a higher a has an ambiguous
eﬀect on r2. The last term in the ﬁrst-order condition (20) shows the direct and indirect
eﬀects of an increase in a on the self-selection constraint. It is easy to see that the sign
of this term is ambiguous. The last term disappears in the full-information case. The
government weighs these various direct and indirect eﬀects when determining the optimal
amount of managerial advice.
At this point, we are interested in the eﬀect that a change in the level of managerial
advice—speciﬁcally, an increase in managerial advice—has on welfare. Given the diﬃculty
of characterizing the welfare change in general, we focus on the area around zero managerial







Using this, we have:
Proposition 4 Starting from a situation where the BDB does not provide managerial
advice, an increase in managerial input reduces welfare.14
The result in Proposition 4 is counterintuitive. Starting from a situation where no
managerial input is provided, there is a cost of increasing a that is reﬂected in an increase
in the interest rate r2, which directly reduces the welfare of type 2 entrepreneurs. Around
14 Evaluating (20) around a = 0, we obtain (@L=@a)ja=0 = (N2+¸)(@Ω2=@r2)(@r2=@a)ja=0 = ¡(N2+
¸)=N2u20 < 0.
17a = 0, this cost is not matched by an increase in entrepreneurs’ probability of success.
In essence, Proposition 4 says that the government has no incentive to provide a small
amount of managerial advice starting from a position of zero advice. According to (20),
however, larger amounts of managerial advice may be optimal.15 Proposition 4 suggests
that governments should not interfere in business decisions beyond the provision of capital,
unless they have enough expertise to provide the right level of advice. Thus, a little bit of
advice can be more detrimental for welfare than no advice at all.
5. Conclusion
The literature on entrepreneurship has long recognized the fact that venture capital is a
major form of external ﬁnancing for new ﬁrms. Despite evidence that most governments in
developed countries have public venture capital programs in place, no economic analyses
of these programs exist in the literature. The main objective of this paper has been to
build a model that endogenously determines the optimal amount of venture capital and
managerial advice provided by the Business Development Bank. Our analysis is based on
an occupational-choice model with informational constraints.
Our results for the supply of capital, supply of entrepreneurs, and managerial in-
put depend on the environment and on the informational assumptions we consider. We
ﬁnd that, with full information, entrepreneurs who are more or less able may be credit-
rationed or overinvest compared with the proﬁt-maximizing outcome. Furthermore, the
introduction of asymmetric information has no eﬀect on the use of capital by more-able
entrepreneurs. Less-able entrepreneurs, however, may be credit-rationed compared with
the full-information case.
When we examine the eﬀect of public venture capital on the supply of entrepreneurs,
we ﬁnd that the occupational-choice equilibrium is characterized by an ineﬃcient number
of less-able entrepreneurs compared with the number chosen by a government that controls
access to occupations. This result holds irrespective of the informational assumption—full
15 In a diﬀerent setting, Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2000) show that a tax on entrepreneurship and/or a
tax on start-up investment increases managerial advice and has a positive ﬁrst-order eﬀect on welfare.
18or asymmetric information. The occupational-choice equilibrium has too many or too few
less-able entrepreneurs, depending on the relative eﬀect of an increase in their number—
versus that of workers—on the welfare of all entrepreneurs. If entry into entrepreneurship
increases workers’ welfare by more than it reduces the welfare of entrepreneurs, then we
can conclude that the equilibrium has too few entrepreneurs. The opposite holds if entry
into entrepreneurship reduces entrepreneurs’ welfare by more than it increases workers’
welfare.
One of the main roles of venture capitalists, besides supplying capital to start-ups, is
to provide managerial expertise. In this paper, the eﬀect of managerial advice on welfare
has been, in general, ambiguous. We ﬁnd, however, that, starting with a situation in which
the BDB does not provide managerial advice, a small increase in the level of advice has
a negative eﬀect on welfare; it results in an increase in the interest rate for more-able
entrepreneurs that is not oﬀset by an increase in their probability of success.
One limitation of our model is that only public venture capital is available. The
simplest way to introduce private venture capital into the model is to have individuals ﬁrst
shop for it, and have those who are rejected apply for public venture capital ﬁnancing. In
this case, individuals who are more able obtain private venture capital; less-able individuals
apply for public venture capital. It is clear that the equilibrium in the market for public
venture capital is still characterized in terms of our results. The problem with this simple
framework is that only less-able entrepreneurs are ﬁnanced with public venture capital. An
alternative would be to assume that individuals ﬁrst apply for private venture capital, as
before, and that they get matched to a venture capitalist according to a matching function.
Those who do not get matched with a private venture capitalist can apply for public venture
capital. This scenario would allow us to avoid the problem of having only less-able types
apply for public venture capital. Another possibility is to have individuals diﬀer with
respect to two characteristics; for example, ability and risk aversion. Unfortunately, the
analysis becomes too complicated to allow us to obtain simple results. Our model is,
however, consistent with evidence that most of the private venture capital ﬁnances the
growth and development stages of a ﬁrm, rather than the early stages of a start-up (Amit,
19Brander, and Zott 1997).
In this paper, we have analyzed the equilibrium with public venture capital in the
form of government loans. As stated in the introduction, governments also directly supply
capital in the form of equity investments in start-ups. An interesting extension of our model
would consider a scenario where the government oﬀers both debt and equity ﬁnancing. It
would, however, be technically very diﬃcult to solve for an interior solution where both
debt and equity are oﬀered in equilibrium. The literature has recognized this fact and has
thus far considered debt and equity ﬁnancing separately.16 Overcoming these technical
diﬃculties is an area for future work.
16 See Hellman and Stiglitz (2000) for a discussion of this point.
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The proof is straightforward. Recall that, when maximizing utility or, equivalently,
proﬁts, the entrepreneur selects capital so that Fi
K = 1+ri, and so MRSi
r;K = 0. For the
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27Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
We ﬁrst specify the following notation:
® ´E1@Ω1
@w
+ (N2 + ¸2)
@Ω2
@w






































































































































































































From the single-crossing property, we know that MRS1
rK < \ MRS
2
rK, 8(r;K).











































































































29Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3
If the government can directly control access to occupations, it chooses
fE1;r1;r2;K1;K2g to maximize the utilitarian social welfare function
W ´ E1Ω1(w;r1;K1) + N2Ω2(w;r2;K2) + (N1 ¡ E1)u(w); (C1)
subject to the zero-proﬁt condition
(1 + r1)E1K1 + (1 + r2)N2K2 = (1 + r)(E1K1 + N2K2); (C2)
the labour-market clearing condition
N2(1 + `2) + E1(1 + `1) = N; (C3)
and the self-selection constraint
Ω2(w;r2;K2) ¸ b Ω1(w;r2;K2): (C4)


















The labour-market clearing condition allows us to determine the wage rate as a function
of (E1;K1;K2), with
@w




























30The Lagrangian for the BDB problem is
max
fE1;r1;K1;K2g
L =E1Ω1(w;r1;K1) + N2Ω2(w;r2;K2) + (N1 ¡ E1)u(w)
+ ¸[Ω2(w;r2;K2) ¡ b Ω2(w;r1;K1)]:
The ﬁrst-order condition for E1 is
@L































Evaluating at the free occupational-choice equilibrium E1 = (E1)
OC, characterized by





































Equation (C6) shows that, when individuals freely choose their occupation, they ignore
the eﬀects of their choice on welfare operating through changes in the wage rate, w, and
the rate of interest faced by type 2 entrepreneurs, r2. An increase in E1 increases w, which
increases the utility of workers and decreases the utility of both types of entrepreneurs. A
higher E1 also increases r2 and thus lowers the utility of type 2 entrepreneurs.
With perfect information about types ¸ = 0, the overall eﬀect of an increase in E1 is
ambiguous. Thus, the equilibrium with occupational choice is characterized by too few or
too many entrepreneurs.
This result also holds under the assumption of asymmetric information about types.
In this case, ¸ 6= 0 and, besides the eﬀects of an increase in E1 identiﬁed above, there
is an additional eﬀect on the self-selection constraint (C4): it requires that a type 2 en-
trepreneur has no incentive to mimic a type 1 entrepreneur. An increase in the number
of type 1 entrepreneurs increases the wage rate, which, in turn, lowers the utility of a
31type 2 entrepreneur. At the same time, a higher wage rate also lowers the utility of the
mimicker. The eﬀect on the diﬀerence between the two utilities is ambiguous. Thus, a
higher E1 can tighten or relax the self-selection constraint. Again, we conclude that, in
the equilibrium with occupational choice, there are too few, too many, or just the right
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